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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 11/2 -- Control of Dissemination
and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence
Information

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 26 January 1960, same subject

1. In making the following comments on Draft #5 of subject, I am aware that they do not necessarily agree with comments from other DD/I offices; I believe, however, that they warrant your consideration.

2. Our general reaction to Draft #5 is that the NOFORN control section is unnecessarily complicated and considerably more difficult to understand and use than the corresponding section in Draft #1 of last September. We feel that the control of dissemination to foreign governments should be based on two fundamental rules: (1) that classified documents will not be passed to a foreign government without permission of the originating agency; (2) that classified sources and intelligence methods will not be revealed to foreign governments by recipient agencies. With these two basic rules, the only further control required is control of the substantive positive intelligence information within the documents. Thus, the control stamp "NOFORN" need be placed on documents only to indicate that the substantive information in the documents should not be passed to foreign governments without specific approval of the originator. We believe that if the NOFORN control problem is handled in this manner that the producers of raw intelligence reports will have adequate assurance that documents, sources, and methods are protected and that the NOFORN stamp need be applied only when information in the report requires such control because of its substance or because the positive information in itself discloses sources or methods.

3. Although the definition of "finished intelligence" in Draft #5 is not completely accurate or satisfactory from our point of view, we do feel that it is useful in order to differentiate in

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the Directive between "finished intelligence" and "digests and summaries." The control NOFORN could then be modified by the clause "EXCEPT IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE" as applicable. The distinction between "finished intelligence" and information in extracted and summarized form where it does not lose its identity is valuable in insuring the producers of information reports of adequate protection of sources and methods so that they will not over-control their issuances. The distinction between "finished intelligence" and "digests and summaries" should be made not on the basis of the issuing Office mission or publication title, but rather on the way in which the information is utilized in the intelligence product. For example, the articles in Part III of the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary generally meet the minimum requirements for what should be considered finished intelligence for purposes of this Directive.

4. The description of the INTELLCON CONTROL marking seems to include two basic points: first, the restriction of sensitive information to a few selected officials; and secondly, the withholding of certain information from consultants, personnel on external projects, etc. It is suggested that the control of sensitive information to a few selected officials can be adequately handled on an "EYES ONLY" basis and that the INTELLCON CONTROL should be reserved for marking documents that should be generally available within the intelligence community except to consultants, personnel on external projects, etc. The [REDACTED] reports form a major portion of those requiring the latter control because of the proprietary nature of much of the information provided in such reports. However, I suspect that a majority of them could not be considered sensitive for other reasons.

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OAD/RR:OEGuthe: [REDACTED] am/8895 (17 February 1960)